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The purpose of this MBA Project is to investigate the possibility/feasibility of re-
engineering the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Module (PMS-420) business process to 
function more efficiently. The Defense Acquisition system is designed to support the 
National Security Strategy by managing the technologies and programs that produce 
weapons system for the United States Armed Forces.  This paper reviews the genesis of 
PEO LMW and its basic functionality, as well as discusses in detail the unique business 
processes of PMS-420 and its varied inter-agency relationships.  Additionally, this paper 
discusses the business processes of two other acquisition programs within PEO LMW; 1) 
Naval Special Warfare (PMS-340) and 2) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS-408).  
Business processes and management policies of these other acquisition programs that 
promote efficiency are presented and analyzed for their applicability to PMS-420.  The 
final portion of this paper is a summary of the findings and recommendations to PMS 420 
in order for it to function more efficiently. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND  
The Defense Acquisition system is designed to support the national security 
strategy by managing the technologies and programs that produce weapons system for the 
United States Armed Forces.  In doing so, the acquisition objective is to provide the best 
quality weapons for the needs of the combatant commanders, in a timely manner, and at a 
reasonable price.1  Because defense acquisition uses publicly generated funding in the 
form of tax revenue, it is incumbent upon the Department of Defense (DoD) and Service 
leaders to be good stewards of the public monies entrusted to them.  The accountability 
for this stewardship is made easier as Congress has a significant say in where, when, and 
how public monies are spent on national defense.  One defense acquisition program 
within congressional oversight is the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program.  The 
LCS acquisition program is managed by two program offices: 1) The LCS Mission 
Modules Program Office (PMS-420), under Program Executive Office, Littoral Mine 
Warfare (PEO/LMW) and 2) the Littoral Combat Ship Program Office (PMS-501), under 
Program Executive Office, Ships (PEO/Ships).  PMS-420 is responsible for six initial 
warfare mission module acquisitions:  two each of Mine Warfare (MIW), Anti-
Submarine Warfare (ASW) and Surface Warfare (SUW).2  These mission modules are to 
be integrated into the LCS sea frame.  PMS-501 is responsible for the acquisition of the 
LCS sea frame as well as final integration of the mission module with the sea frame.   
 
B. OBJECTIVES 
Although the overall acquisition system functions as designed, the purpose of this 
project was to investigate the business processes within the LCS Mission Modules 
                                                 
1 Defense Acquisition University; Introduction to Defense Acquisition, (Fort Belvoir, VA, Defense 
Acquisition University Press, November 2003) 1. 
2 PEO Littoral Mine Warfare; Report to Congress Littoral Combat Ship Mission Packages, 
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Program Office (PMS-420) and to determine whether another more efficient process 
design could be identified.    
 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. Primary Question 
• Can PMS-420 be re-engineered for greater efficiency? 
2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
• What would have to change in the PMS-420 business process that 
would enable it to function more efficiently?  
o What are the internal design constraints? 
o What are the external constraints? 
• Do smaller programs such as PMS-340 and PMS-408 provide any 
models for improving the larger PMS-420? 
3. Is it possible to implement change in the current political environment? 
• What are the barriers within PEO LMW and DoN? 
• What are the barriers within DoD and Congress? 
 
D. SCOPE, ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. PMS-420 
This project focuses on the business process for PMS-420.  The scope of this 
project includes a review of what comprises a business model, a review of the current 
acquisition process, and an analysis of the business process utilized by PMS-420.         
2. PMS 340 and 408  
PMS 340 and PMS 408 are two program offices located within PEO/LMW.  
Although smaller in scope than PMS-420, these programs were chosen as comparison 
because they have been identified by the Program Executive Officer as being two of the 
more efficient programs in PEO/LMW.  PMS-340 and PMS-408 typically manage 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) program level III or below.  Because the decision 
authority for these programs is typically at the PEO or System Commands level, they do 
not garner the same level of congressional scrutiny of a major program. Although the 
acquisition program managed by PMS-340 and PMS-408 differ in size from the PMS-
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420 program, a comparison could identify transferable business processes. A detailed 
description of the acquisition categories is in Appendix A. 
3. LIMITATIONS  
The scope of this study is has been limited to the topic of business process re-
engineering. There may be areas of knowledge pertaining to the operations of PMS-420 
that could not be incorporated into this study based upon financial limitations or time 
constraints.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
The author conducted a series of interviews with members of the organizations. 
The individuals to be interviewed were identified by PEO/LMW.  The interviews ranged 
from one-on-one, one-on-two, and in one case a group setting of eight.  The interview 
sessions lasted anywhere from 40 minutes to 1-1/2 hours.  Each interview session was 
conducted at the program offices at the Washington Navy Yard or at the Navy’s Indian 
Head, Maryland location.   
During the interviews the focus of the project was discussed and three basic 
questions were asked, 1) What is the history of your organization, 2) What is your 
business process, and 3) If you could re-engineer your process differently, what would it 
look like?   The questioning was conducted in an informal atmosphere to allow for open 
communication and sharing of experiences by the interviewees.   
 
F. ORGANIZATION OF PROJECT 
Chapter II reviews the basics of business process re-engineering efforts in private 
industry and government organizations.  Chapters III presents the history of PEO/LMW 
and the genesis of this relatively new PEO.   Chapter IV briefly describes the acquisition 
process and environment, as well as presents the business processes utilized by PMS-408 
and PMS-420.  Chapter V presents an analysis of the collected data.  Chapter VI presents 
a re-engineering recommendation and conclusion. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING (BPR) 
1. Business Re-engineering Overview 
In the Michael Hammer and James Champy book, "Reengineering the 
Corporation",  the two define business process re-engineering (BPR) as, “The 
fundamental rethinking and radical redesign of business processes to achieve dramatic 
improvements in critical contemporary measures of performance, such as cost, quality, 
service, and speed.”3   The business processes of an entire organization can be the subject 
of re-engineering or it can be focused on the processes of a single department.  Hammer 
and Champy emphasize four keywords in their definition: fundamental, radical, dramatic, 
and processes. 
“Fundamental” means asking the basic questions, “Why do we do what we do? 
And why do we do it the way we do?”4  Hammer and Champy suggest that the answers 
to these questions force people to look at rules and assumptions that are foundational to 
the way business is conducted.  Many times however, these rules are, “obsolete, 
erroneous or inappropriate.”5  The example given is that of a business wanting to perform 
credit checks more efficiently on its customers.  The question they say shouldn’t be, 
“How can we perform credit checks more efficiently?” because that assumes that credit 
checks must be done.  Instead, the business should ask the basic question, “Why do we 
perform credit checks on customers?”  This basic question allows for the possible answer 
that the cost of performing the credit checks may exceed the bad debt loss the credit 
checks are designed to prevent.6   If it is determined that credit checks are necessary and 
cost beneficial, then the business can began the fundament process of re-engineering by 
asking, “Why do we do it the way we do it?” 
                                                 
3 Michael Hammer and James Champy, Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifesto for Business 
Revolution, (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1995) 32 
4 Hammer and Champy, 32 
5 Hammer and Champy, 33 
6 Hammer and Champy, 33 
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“Radical” is how the business process must be redesigned.  It is more than 
tweaking an existing process.  It is like taking a ‘clean slate’ and starting from scratch.  
Hammer and Champy say, “In re-engineering, radical redesign means disregarding all 
existing structures and procedures and inventing completely new ways of accomplishing 
work.”7 In a perfect world with an unlimited budget, this particular approach to re-
engineering would be possible.  But critics of Hammer and Champy state, “Regardless of 
Hammer's exhortation: “Don't automate, obliterate!” clean slate change is rarely found in 
practice…a “blank sheet of paper” used in design usually requires a “blank check” for 
implementation.” 8  This paper investigates government agencies which operate under 
fiscal constraints and “blank check” financing is not likely.  For government agencies and 
many private companies, a more affordable approach is to consider using a clean slate 
design but implement the design over several phased projects.9   
“Dramatic,” the third key word, is essentially the type of performance change a 
business is expecting from the re-engineering investment.  “Re-engineering is not about 
making marginal or incremental improvements but about achieving quantum leaps in 
performance.” 10  From this perspective, a business seeking only a few more percentage 
points in sales or cost reductions most likely will not undergo re-engineering efforts.  
There are three types of companies that Hammer and Champy have identified that adopt 
re-engineering.  The first is a company that has no other choice.  If their costs far exceed 
industry norms or if quality is seen as worst in the industry, these companies can benefit 
from a quantum leap in performance.  The second is a company that foresees a problem 
on the horizon and chooses to navigate around it by re-engineering their business process. 
The third type is the company that already sets the industry standards and has no 
foreseeable troubles.  But because of their aggressive management style and business 
savvy, this third set of companies seek to raise the bar for the competition.11   
                                                 
7 Hammer and Champy, 33 
8 Yogesh Malhotra. "Business Process Redesign: An Overview," IEEE Engineering Management 
Review, vol. 26, no. 3, Fall 1998. (URL: http://www.kmbook.com/bpr.htm)   
9 Malhotra, 1  
10 Hammer and Champy, 33 
11 Hammer and Champy, 33 
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The last keyword word is “Processes.”  Hammer and Champy write that the 
process is a set of activities that take various inputs to produce a valuable output to the 
customer.12   The value that is added to the output, is only realized when the customer 
takes delivery of the output.  Therefore, processes that occur inside or outside the 
organization that delay or prevent delivery of the output to the customer must be changed 
or abolished.  It is for this reason that re-engineering efforts must focus on the business 
processes of organizations or their departments.13    
 
B. BUSINESS PROCESS RE-ENGINEERING METHODOLOGY 
1. Adaptive Business Process:  Sense and Respond 
When asked the question, “What kind of change do you expect your organization 
to face during the next decade?” more than 75 percent of the executive attendees at the 
IBM Advanced Business Institute Strategy Courses held between May 1994 and 
November 1998, believed that some form of business environment discontinuity would 
be the greatest challenge they would face.14 An adaptive business process is one that is 
designed to sense the changing needs of the business environment, and quickly adapt. In 
an unpredictable environment, where no reliable indicators of future needs exist, the 
ability to adapt to change must take precedence over business process efficiency.15   
Efficient business processes that support irrelevant tasks, or produce antiquated products 
are a waste of time and resources.  The adaptive or “sense-and-respond” business model 
provides a means for meeting the ever changing business environment.  The goal is not to 
predict the future business environment, but to identify environmental change as it 
happens, and to respond quickly and appropriately.16  A simple sense-and-respond model 
is at Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
12 Hammer and Champy, 35 
13 Hammer and Champy, 40 
14 Stephen H. Haeckel, Adaptive Enterprise, (Boston: Harvard, 1999) 1 
15 Stephen H. Haeckel, 6 
16 Stephen H. Haeckel, 3 
 
Figure 1.   Sense and Respond Loop 
Source:  Stephen H. Haeckel, Adaptive Enterprise, (Boston: Harvard, 1999) 5 
 
In Figure 1, the Organizational Context is comprised of three basic parts:  the 
organizations reason for being, its governing principles and its high level business design.  
“Unlike typical mission and vision statements, which propose a (sometimes inconsistent) 
mix of goals and principles, a reason for being statement unequivocally defines the 
organization’s primary purpose — the one outcome that justifies its existence.”17  
Governing principles set forth the organizations limits of actions for its employees, and 
the high level business design is the organization’s essential structure.  The high level 
business design, “illustrates the relationships among elements both inside and outside the 
organization in terms of outcomes they owe one another — the outcomes essential to 
achieving the enterprise reason for being.”18  These three components of Organizational 
Context work together to provide accountable, empowered members the direction the 
                                                 
17 Stephen H. Haeckel, 17 
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18 Stephen H. Haeckel, 17 
organization is headed, the boundaries set for member actions, and how members are to 
relate to what others do and how to relate to organizational purpose. 19  
Coordination of Capabilities, the next part of the Adaptive Business Process, is 
based on the organizational leaders’ responsibility for commitment management.  When 
organizational roles are defined in terms of commitments instead of activities; the 
emphasis is placed on the interaction of system elements vice actions.  Deciding how the 
commitment is met is the responsibility of those making the commitment as long as the 
“how” falls with the limits set by organization.  Therefore, the organizational leader’s 
responsibility is to manage commitments in keeping with organizational context and 
purpose.  Finally, internal feedback mixed with external signals from the business 
environment, are used to adapt the business process within the organizational context.  
The adaptive loop depicts the events that drive a sense and respond organization.  An 
example adaptive loop process is at Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   The Adaptive Loop 
Source:  Stephen H. Haeckel, Adaptive Enterprise, (Boston: Harvard, 1999) 76 
 
 
                                                 
19 Stephen H. Haeckel, 17 
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III. HISTORY OF PEO/LMW 
A. CHANGING ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT 
The events of September 11th, 2001 changed the way an enemy is defined in the 
minds of most Americans.  As a result, the DoD began to undertake an aggressive 
transformation plan geared to develop future military capabilities that are both flexible 
enough and lethal enough to address the challenges from a variety of threats.  The 
transformation road map is laid out in the “Transformation Planning Guidance.”  In this 
plan, the scope of transformation is centered on transforming how we fight, transforming 
how we do business and transforming how we work with others.20  Transforming how we 
do business in relation to the acquisition process is the focus of this paper.  
  In transforming the way we do business, DoD has directed programs offices 
create a more streamlined acquisition process to eliminate non-value added steps.  A 
more streamlined process must allow for adaptive planning methods built on accelerated 
acquisition cycle concepts such as spiral development. And thirdly, a streamlined 
acquisition process must also be supported by capabilities based resources allocation.  
Putting these concepts together, there will be fewer people in the decision making process 
to help the process move faster.  The decision makers who remain in the process must be 
flexible in their thinking and employ flexible planning systems to take advantage of 
technologies generated by spiral development.  Finally, resource allocations must be 
aligned to fund warfare capabilities across a broad spectrum of platforms instead of the 
traditional platform specific funding.    
   
B. REALIGNMENT OF THE PEO’S 
In early October 2002, John Young, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) for 
Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) released a message calling for the 
realignment of the offices within ASN/RD&A as well as some PEOs and Systems 
                                                 
20 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transformation Planning Guidance” April 2003, (Washington DC: Office of 
The Secretary of Defense) 6 
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Commands (SYSCOMS).  This realignment came, “as part of an ongoing review of the 
effectiveness and efficiency of our existing acquisition structure…”21  Secretary Young 
stated that the purpose of the change was to facilitate becoming better aligned to address 
the 21st century challenges the Navy and Marine Corps will face.  To this end, the 
acquisition community should no longer optimize by program and platform but by 
integrated systems that cross many platforms and functions as needed in the 21st 
century.22    
The business advantage for acquisition programs being realigned along integrated 
weapons systems vice platforms is that integrated systems, with open architecture, allow 
for mixing and matching weapon system based upon need.  A weapon system that is used 
on multiple platforms increases business buying power for Navy Acquisition.23  An 
example would be if the Navy was buying a new combat ship that required a surface 
mounted gun, the gun could be procured at a lower price if it was already in service on 
existing ships. The acquisition strategy for the gun system would then be for use on a 
variety of platforms for a variety on missions. The combat ships acquisition strategy 
would then be to use a surface mounted gun already in service that would meet the 
intended mission requirements for the vessel.  Not only could this approach potentially 
save billions of dollars in weapon system development cost, but the training systems and 
the logistical support for training on a new gun system would be eliminated.  But in order 
for this business advantage to be realized, the acquisition community would have to brace 
for the challenges that accompanied this realignment around integrated weapons systems. 
Secretary Young, aware of the challenges this realignment presented, closed his October 
2002 message with the following:  
“These changes have been carefully thought out by the existing PEOs and 
SYSCOMS…There are some significant changes here, especially the movement from a 
platform focus to an integrated system focus.  There are always challenges when change 
                                                 
21 John J. Young, Jr., “Realignment of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, 
Development and Acquisition, SYSCOMS and PEOs,” 112123Z Oct 2002, general administrative message 
from ASN/RDA (Washington DC: ASN/RDA) 1 
22 John J. Young, Jr., 1 
23 John J. Young, Jr., 2 
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occurs, but in the end it will improve how and what we deliver.  Your support and 
feedback as we transition to this new structure will be most appreciated.”24
 
C. THE GENESIS OF PEO/LMW 
In November 2002, one month after the release of Secretary Young’s message, 
the PEO for Mine and Undersea Warfare (MUW) received new tasking and a new name.  
PEO/LMW was formed and its roles expanded to include five other areas, namely: 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Special Warfare, Integrated Undersea Surveillance 
Systems, unique Mine Warfare systems and Assault vehicles.  PEO/LMW is a 
“capabilities based PEO and is focused on bringing capability to the Littoral Battle 
Space.”25  Because of the inherent challenges of incorporating these warfare areas under 
a single PEO, the program managers for LMW must maintain close coordination with 
each other in order to ensure the proper capability perspective is integrated between the 
program managers and the program offices.26  In total, the scope of LMW covers the life 
cycle responsibilities and management responsibilities for seven programs covering 210 
systems.27  The PEO/LMW program office codes and some of the programs and systems 
they managed are at Table 1.   
                                                 
24 John J. Young, Jr., 4 
25 LMW Program Office Descriptions, Program Executive Office for Littoral and Mine Warfare, Dec 
2, 2005; 1. (unpublished paper) 
26 PEO/LMW Project Officer, Personal interview 
27 Program Executive Office for Littoral Mine Warfare, “Power Point Brief for Dr. Delores Etter, ASN 
(RD&A) 30 Nov 2005. (Unpublished paper: Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.; Dec 2, 2005), 4 
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Table 1.   PEO/LMW Program Offices and Tasks. 
Source: PEO/LMW Program Office Descriptions, 1-2 
Program Office Description of Tasking 
PMS 495 
Mine Warfare Systems: Comprised of all Navy 
mining as well as the Surface Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM), subsurface MCM, 
Airborne Mine Defense, and Amphibious Mine 
Countermeasures systems and equipment.   
PMS 480   
The Anti-Terrorism Afloat Systems encompass 
the total life cycle management of Anti-
Terrorism Afloat and Anti-Terrorism 
Expeditionary systems and equipment. 
PMS 485   
The Maritime Surveillance Systems encompass 
the Advanced Deployable System (ADS), 
Fixed Surveillance System (FSS) and 
Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System 
(SURTASS) programs.  
PMS 403   
Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs): 
Encompass those unmanned undersea systems, 
both tethered and non-tethered, which can 
operate independently from or in concert with 
submarines and surface ships.  
PMS 408   
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD): 
Encompass systems used to detect/locate 
access, examine, identify, render safe and/or 
dispose of surface and underwater explosive 
ordnance.  
PMS 420   
Littoral Combat Ship Mission Modules: 
Encompass warfare specific mission modules 
for Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).   
PMS 340 
The Naval Special Warfare (NSW): Encompass 
equipment associated with Special Ops 
maritime support of fleet operations; SEAL 
diver life support; SEAL Delivery Vehicles 
(SDV), etc.  Special Ops missions are non-
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IV. BUSINESS PROCESS IN ACTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Not every program office within PEO/LMW is funded at the same level nor do 
they operate in exactly the same way.  The dollar amounts invested in the acquisition of a 
system will usually define both its size and the flexibility the program has in how it 
operates. This chapter begins with a brief overview of the acquisition lifecycle process 
that is common to all acquisition programs, then concludes with discussions on specific 
business processes for the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program Office (PMS-408) and 
the Littoral Combat Ship Mission Module Program Office (PMS-420).  
 
B. ACQUISITION PROCESS OVERVIEW 
The acquisition of the LCS Mission Module has its genesis in the Acquisition Life 
Cycle.  The Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management defines the Acquisition 
Life Cycle process as being, “… made up of periods of time called phases and each phase 
is separated by decision point called a milestone.”28
Throughout the life cycle of an acquisition, the program is under constant review. 
Prior to the completion of a milestone, the Program Manager decides whether or not the 
acquisition process meets the criteria to move onto the next phase of development.  If the 
acquisition program meets the established criteria the Program Manager can propose to 
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) that a Milestone in the acquisition has been 
completed.  The MDA is authorized to approve the acquisition programs transition to the 
next phase after exit criteria have been met.29   “These milestones and other decision 
points provide the Program Manager and MDA the framework with which to review 
acquisition programs, monitor and administer progress, identify problems, and make 
corrections.”30  A typical life cycle management framework is represented at Figure 4. 
                                                 
28 Defense Acquisition University, 50 
29 Defense Acquisition University,  50 
30 Defense Acquisition University, 50 
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Figure 3.   Defense Acquisition Management Framework 
       Source: Introduction to Defense Acquisition Management, 49 
 
The life cycle of a program begins with the planning to satisfy a mission need 
before the program officially begins.  Program initiation normally occurs at Milestone B 
and takes the program through research, development, production, deployment, support, 
upgrade, and, demilitarization and disposal.31  
As each program goes through the life cycle process there are constant reviews 
undertaken to determine the programs effectiveness.  One performance metric used by 
PEO/LMW to establish the effectiveness of the programs is the execution rate of 
budgeted resources.  This execution rate is determined in large part by the expenditure 
rate of apportioned funds from annual congressional appropriations.  Program Managers 
track program expenditures (costs) based on the terms of the program contract.  As costs 
are incurred and milestone met, the program is considered progressing or commonly 
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referred to as being “executed” as budgeted.  A more detailed description of the 
acquisition life cycle is provided at Appendix B. 
 
C. STREAMLINE THE BUSINESS PROCESS 
A streamlined business process seeks to eliminate non-value added steps to get 
the product to the customer sooner.  Within PEO/LMW, Naval Special Warfare (PMS 
340) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS 408) are two program offices that manage 
mostly ACAT III and IV acquisitions programs.  A detailed description of the acquisition 
categories is at Appendix A.  PMS-340 manages a variety of small arms programs and 
semi-autonomous underwater vehicle programs for Naval Special Warfare.  Because of 
the smaller dollar amounts involved in PMS-340 ACAT III level programs, the classified 
nature of these programs and the highly-trained, operationally savvy, well-defined user 
group for these systems, PMS-340 can often receive special acquisition authority that 
allows them to tailor the acquisition process in order to speed delivery of the systems to 
the war fighters in the field.32  Highly educated user groups, such as Naval Special 
Warfare forces, are those groups that are directly involved in the design and operational 
suitability of the systems being developed.  The business process of PMS-340 is similar 
to that of PMS-408 in that both program offices manage what is considered smaller 
programs and both have highly-trained, operationally savvy, well-defined user groups.  
Not withstanding the classified nature of the PMS-340 programs, their basic business 
process is similar to that of PMS-408 which manages several unclassified ACAT IV level 
programs.  In order to maintain the unclassified level of this research, this paper details 
the unclassified business processes for PMS-408 only, to determine if efficiencies can be 
transferred to PMS-420. 
1. Business Process for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS-408) 
There are three basic reasons PMS-408 is able to operate efficient, streamlined 
acquisition programs.  First, the MDA level for PMS-408 programs is at the PEO level or 
below.  Second, PMS-408 programs leverage technology from pre-existing systems to 
                                                 
32 Senior PMS-340 personnel, Personal Interview, March 31, 2006 
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shorten production and delivery times of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) tools to 
the fleet. And thirdly, PMS-408 uses User Operational Evaluation Systems (UOES).   
PMS-408 is primarily responsible for ACAT IV level programs.  An ACAT IV 
MDA is designated in accordance with service component policy with review and 
decision authority set at the lowest appropriate level.  For PMS-408, MDA has been 
designated as the Program Executive Officer for Littoral Mine Warfare.  If an acquisition 
programs falls below the ACAT IV level, it is considered an Abbreviated Acquisition 
Program (AAP).  In these cases the MDA is delegated below the PEO level.33  When the 
MDA works in close physical proximity to the system design teams and operational users 
of the EOD tool, there are fewer levels of management involved in the milestone decision 
process.  As a result, there is less staff working hours spent developing and preparing 
briefs for the various levels of management and the time it takes to get a milestone 
decision from the MDA is shortened.  Therefore, movement from one milestone phase to 
the next happens quickly, and time from requirements approval to production decision is 
greatly reduced. Of the 28 programs managed by PMS-408, 20 are currently or projected 
to be AAP.34   
When advanced technology already exists, PMS-408 leverages this technology to 
bring required capability to the Navy.  An example is the acquisition of the MK 1/2 EOD 
robots.  During the Analysis of Alternatives in the acquisition life cycle, it was 
determined that a commercially available robot could meet the EOD requirement with a 
few modifications.  PMS-408 contacted the commercial vendor, discussed the needed 
modifications, and a requirement approval was reached.  The time from requirements 
approval to production decision was just three years.  Initial Operating Capability is 
expected within six months of Milestone C production.35  In this case, the technology 
leveraging could streamline the process because full scale development was not required 
and explosives were not designed into the system.  When existing technology is not 
available to meet EOD requirements, full scale development is required and can add a 
                                                 
33  Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview, March 30, 2006 
34 PMS-408 presentation, “Program Management Office Explosive Ordnance Disposal Presentation,” 
March 30, 2006, 12-13 
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year or more to the acquisition process.36  When explosive are required to be designed 
into the system, the acquisition must go through a Weapons Explosive Safety Review 
Board certification which can add two years or more to the acquisition life cycle.  Where 
possible, PMS-408 works with system design teams to develop systems that can allow 
explosives to be added at the operator’s location instead of designed into the system, 
saving both time and money.37   
Finally, PMS-408 credits its business success to its dialogue with the operational 
customer, and through User Operational Evaluation Systems (UOES).  UOES, are 
preliminary operational capability systems that are given to a special team of operators 
for use in an operational environment.  These special operators evaluate the 
preproduction system, and provide immediate feedback to the design team so that 
adjustments are made prior to production decision and Low Rate Initial Production 
(LRIP).  One of the first steps in this process is called “Industry Day.”  Industry Day is an 
opportunity for Navy officials to meet with private industry experts to discuss EOD 
requirements.  Prior to Industry Day, Navy officials make an announcement to private 
industry experts outlining capabilities the Navy is trying to achieve.  Companies having 
mature technology able to address the Navy’s capability requirements meet for individual 
presentations on Industry Day.  (Often the Navy can get an idea of the maturity level of 
required technology by the number of companies that respond to Industry Day 
announcements.)38  Industry Day presentations is when the Navy finds out what is 
available, technologically, that can solve the problems that face the Navy.  If the results 
of Industry Day presentations are that Navy requirements fall outside the realm of the 
possible, then written requirements are delayed.  Industry Day helps PMS-408 refine the 
requirements before they are written as firm requirements.  Industry Day also gives 
private industry an opportunity to ask for specific details from the Navy in order get a 
better idea of what capabilities are being sought.  
 
35 PMS-408 presentation, 12-13 
36 PMS-408 presentation, 14 
37 Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview 
38 Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview 
=
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 20 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
An example of an UOES program is the unmanned undersea vehicles (UUV) 
program.  UUV programs are not the typical acquisition program.  UUVs need operator 
design input to ensure the system meets Human System Interface (HSI) requirements.  In 
other words, the operator needs to relay information on how easy the system is to use in 
the intended environment.  Is it comfortable?  Is it easy to figure out how to operate?  
HSI is an important component in system design when multi-tasking is required from 
minimally manned units.  The ability of the operator to move from one system to another 
and quickly acclimate to the new system is the bases upon which HSI can determine the 
success or failure of a systems design.  Failures in HSI can delay a production decision 
for acquisition program.  UOES provide EOD teams with the opportunity for in-depth 
HSI, before the system enters LRIP.  Additionally, UOES, employ an 80 percent solution 
design concept. This 80 percent solution capability is used in areas where previously no 
capability existed.  The argument is an 80 percent solution to a given problem area is 
better than no solution at all.  For PMS-408, the 80 percent solution is not the end of the 
design process.  The remaining 20 percent is achieved through pre-planned product 
improvements after production decision.39  By making a production decision with an 80 
percent solution, PMS-408 can streamline the acquisition process, and place an asset in 
operation to fill a capability gap.  In cooperation with the resource sponsor, the MDA and 
Program Manager have the freedom to redirect funds to work on programs that need to 
mature and become usable.  So, rather that spend scarce resources to develop the 
remaining 20 percent solution on a test UUV, the remaining 20 percent solution is 
designed into the production vehicles as pre-planned product improvements.  The money 
that would have been spent on the remaining 20 percent solution for a test UUV can be 
reprogrammed to develop mature technology in some other area.40   
The interviews and archival data indicate that the level of flexibility within PMS-
408 is possible as a result of at least two factors.  First, the MDA is placed at the 
appropriate level within the PEO, and thus avoids unnecessary staffing delays. Second, 
the acquisition program is further streamlined by the leveraging of existing technology 
                                                 
39 Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview 
40 Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview 
for EOD tools, and by the introduction of UOES so that timely, capable systems can be 
delivered to EOD operators.  When requirement approval and production decisions can 
be made quickly, acquisition resources and manpower can be made available for other 
acquisition needs.41  The cyclical decision process of sensing the users needs and 
responding quickly, helps to streamline the acquisition life cycle for PMS-408.  
2.  Modeling the Process: Explosive Ordnance Disposal (PMS-408) 
The business process design for PMS-408 can be graphically display using an 
adaptive loop model.  EOD capability gaps are determined by the operational 
environment. Capability needs are sent to PMS-408, via the acquisition process, where 
available technology is leveraged to reduce costs and development time. UOES helps 
PMS-408 decide with system designs will fill the capability gap to at least 80 percent.  
After evaluation of the attributes of the UOES, a production decision can be made to 
further develop and procure the EOD system.  The combination of capability gap 
identification and UOES gives PMS-408 the ability to understand the need to adapt to 
operational change and quickly respond with effective systems. A generic PMS-408 
Adaptive Business Process is at Figure 4.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Generic PMS-408 Adaptive Business Process 
 
                                                 
41 Senior PMS-408 staff member, Personal Interview 
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D. BUSINESS PROCESS FOR LCS MISSION MODULES (PMS-420) 
PMS-420 coordinates with five resource sponsors for development and 
procurement of those mission systems that are not resourced and developed within 
PEO/LMW.  Each mission system is an independent ACAT program and is managed by 
a Program Manager who is not part of the PMS-420 organization.  In addition, PMS-420 
coordinates Mission Package integration with the contracted Mission Package Integrator; 
and coordinates system interface with PMS-501, which is responsible for the sea frame 
acquisition. Acquisition coordination across a broad spectrum of organizations makes 
program oversight and communication essential.  The basic tool utilized by PMS-420 to 
facilitate program coordination is the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).  An MOA 
describes and specifies roles and responsibilities between PMS-420, the responsible 
resource sponsors and each system program office. 
1.  Mission System Resource Sponsors 
A December 2003 MOA between the Director of Expeditionary Warfare, Director 
Air Warfare, Director Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control Division, 
Director Surface Warfare and Director Submarine Warfare, outlines the primary roles and 
responsibilities for resourcing all systems identified as being a candidate for the LCS core 
system and mission packages.42  The MOA provides functional system responsibility for 
platform, sensors, weapons and the communication relay packages.  Although the MOA 
acknowledges that Sea Frame and Mission Modules will be procured and developed 
separately; and that this unique approach requires a new approach to resourcing the 
Mission Modules, the functional areas of responsibility for resourcing the Mission 
Modules remain the same as previous acquisition processes.43    
For example, the responsibility for funding and development of sensors and 
weapons for the ASW mission package falls partly to Director Surface Warfare (N86); 
specifically surface and air launched weapons, and partly to Director Submarine Warfare 
(N87); specifically the Advanced Deployable System (ADS). The tactical Unmanned 
                                                 
42 Department of the Navy, “Memorandum of Agreement between Director of Expeditionary Warfare, 
Director Air Warfare, Director Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control Division, Director 
Surface Warfare and Director Submarine Warfare,” December 8, 2003, 2 
43 Department of the Navy, “Memorandum of Agreement…” 2. 
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Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that is part of the ASW package is funded and developed by 
Director Air Warfare (N88).  PMS-420 is responsible for integration of each of these 
ASW mission systems into the ASW Mission Module as well as being responsible for life 
cycle support for each module.  Since the LCS program is designed around concurrent 
mission system development vice sequential development there is no physical mission 
module on which to base a life cycle plan.  In order to develop a life cycle plan, without 
the aide of a working module, PMS-420 maintains communication with each individual 
mission system Program Manager within each resource sponsor.  If the working module 
existed, the level of communication with each mission system Program Manager would 
be less.44
2.  Independent ACAT Level Programs  
As mentioned, without a working module, PMS-420 maintains communication 
with each individual system Program Manager.  Each mission system in the MIW, ASW 
and SUW mission modules is an independent ACAT program and is managed by a 
Program Manager who is not part of the PMS-420 organization.  Using an ASW mission 
module example, the surface launched weapons, air launched weapons, ADS, and tactical 
UAV each have a Program Manager who is responsible for their own ACAT program 
and reporting to their own MDA.  This is separate from the PMS-420 Mission Module 
ACAT program.  The PMS-420 ACAT program is dependant upon the successful 
delivery of certified mission systems from other Program Managers for integration into 
the Mission Module.  
During the course of development, each mission system matures at varying rates 
and progress through the acquisition life cycle at different rates.   Though specific time 
lines are provided for delivery of the LCS ship and Mission Module, updating the 
timeline can be challenging when each system is being concurrently development.  
Functional and design changes made by Director Air Warfare on the UAV, for example, 
may greatly affect the operation or interface compatibility of the air launched ASW 
weapon being developed by Director Surface Warfare.  For example, if Director Air 
Warfare determines that the size of the UAV must be reduced to be operationally suitable 
                                                 
44 PMS-420 Staff member, Personal Interview 
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for the intended platform, the resulting reduction in size of the UAV may affect its 
weapons carrying payload, and thus affect the weapon design being considered by 
Director Surface Warfare.   
3.  Mission Package Integrator and Mission System/Sea Frame Interface 
PMS-420 coordinates Mission Module integration with Northrop Grumman, the 
Mission Package Integrator (MPI) and coordinates system interface with PMS-501, 
which is responsible for the sea frame acquisition.  PMS-420 is responsible for the LCS 
Mission Module development and life cycle support and works with PMS-501 to ensure 
the mission modules have the proper systems interface with the LCS Sea Frame.    Once 
completed, the mission module will be turned over to the MPI and interfaced with the Sea 
Frame.  In order to complete the systems interface, clear communication must take place 
between the mission system developers, the sea frame developers and the MPI.  This 
information flows through PMS-420 based on MOAs in place with each organization, but 
there is no standardized method by which this communication must flow.  Additionally, 
the MOAs do not provide specific authority for PMS-420 to direct the communication 
structure or method in order to facilitate interagency communication.  
4.  Modeling the Process: LCS Mission Module (PMS-420) 
The business process for PMS-420 functions using a series of MOAs with each 
resource sponsors.  Each resource sponsor is responsible for the acquisition of specific 
mission systems that are later integrated into a Mine Warfare, Anti-submarine Warfare or 
Surface Warfare mission module.  Because the business process functions using a series 
of MOAs, the modeled process looks similar to an organizational chart.  For example, the 
Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) is an acquisition program for Director Surface 
Warfare.  The USV system is to be integrated into the overall Mine Warfare Mission that 
is the responsibility of Director Expeditionary Warfare.  The mine warfare mission 
systems are integrated into the Mine warfare mission module which is the responsibility 
of PMS-420.  The certified Mine Warfare Mission Module is delivered to the Mission 
Package Integrator and later integrated into the LCS Sea Frame.  Interviews and archival 
data indicate that MOAs define roles and responsibility between resource sponsors, but 
do not necessarily define the end product of the relationship, where the end product is 
delivered or how it is delivered.  The combination of MOA’s and other PMS-420 
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V. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
A. BUSINESS PROCESS SHOULD SUIT THE ACQUISITION STRATEGY 
The Transformation Planning Guidance presents adaptive planning, and 
accelerated acquisition cycles based on spiral development, as some of the strategies for 
transforming the way the Department of Defense should conduct business.45  The 
acquisition strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship and Mission Modules, rely on a planned 
accelerated acquisition cycle and spiral development.  These strategies require an 
adaptive business process suited to handle accelerated acquisition with flexible decision 
making. Although the current MOA business structure used by PMS-420 provides 
guidance for relationships and resource responsibilities, it lacks adaptability and 
flexibility.   Further, PMS-420 must be able to determine and affect the critical path for 
all ACAT programs contributing to or supporting the Mission Module Acquisition Plan.  
Finally, a business process must provide methods of accountability and clear lines of 
authority between organizations.    
1.  Flexible Business Process Diagram 
The analysis of the business process for PMS-408 revealed an adaptable, flexible, 
user focused business process similar to the Adaptive Business Process discussed in 
Chapter II.  Chapter IV presented the structural make-up of PMS-408 that facilitates an 
adaptive business process.  The MDA for ACAT IV programs is designated in 
accordance with service component policy.  For the Navy, the MDA is placed at the PEO 
level.  Since some of the programs managed by PMS-408 are Abbreviated Acquisition 
Programs (AAP), the MDA is at a lower level and thus closer to the system design teams 
and the customer.  By leveraging existing technology, PMS-408 is able to shorten the 
acquisition cycle.  Additionally, through the use of UOES, PMS-408 is able to work 
closely with system design experts and operational EOD users.  Because the adaptive 
business process is an open loop process, PMS-408 gets real-time operational feed back 
on preproduction EOD tools.    The combination of these attributes gives PMS-408 a 
distinct advantage in being both flexible and responsive in a changing environment.  
                                                 
45 Donald Rumsfeld, 6 
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A direct comparison of the EOD acquisition strategy with that of the LCS Mission 
Module strategy is not feasible because of the different program sizes, acquisition 
strategies and organizational structures.  The LCS Mission Modules acquisition is an 
ACAT I-D program with funding levels in excess of $3 billion.46  ACAT I-D programs  
receive the highest level of government oversight and scrutiny.  House Appropriations 
Committee report 109-119 included a request for the Navy to provide a report on the 
procurement and development plan for the LCS Mission Module.  This plan was to be 
presented to Congress no later than February 1, 2006.47  Oversight has an acknowledged 
benefit as well as costs.  The time Program Managers spend collecting, organizing and 
presenting data up the Chain of Command delays the acquisition process because the 
Program Managers are busy briefing data rather than managing the programs.  In 
addition, the Secretary of the Navy has been directed, in the FY2006 Defense 
Authorization Act, to submit an annual report to Congress providing current information 
regarding elements of LCS designated as a mission package.48   The report is to be 
submitted to Congress at the same time as the Presidents Budget for the next fiscal 
year.49   
The acquisition strategy for LCS and LCS Mission Modules require that both sea 
frame and Mission Modules be developed concurrently.  Mission modules contain several 
mission systems that must be individually coordinated to meet a predetermined 
acquisition life cycle delivery schedule.  By contrast, EOD acquisition strategies are 
general focused on one user at a time and development happens sequentially according to 
the Program Managers schedule.  Furthermore, the primary acquisition strategy for the 
Mission Modules depends upon spiral development vice technology leveraging as with 
PMS-408.   
 
                                                 
46 PEO, “Power Point Brief for Dr. Delores Etter, 6 
47 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Mine Warfare, “Report to Congress: Littoral Combat Mission 
Packages,” Unpublished (Washington DC: Washington Navy Yard, March 2006) 3 
48 PEO/LMW Report to Congress, 3 
49 PEO/LMW Report to Congress, 3 
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2.  Commitment Management: Identifying the Critical Path 
Looking again at Figure 6, it can be seen that PMS-420 does not have direct 
communication with or oversight of most mission systems being developed.  For 
instance, unlike PMS-408, PMS-420 does not have the same working relationship and 
physical proximity to both operational end users and systems design teams.  When 
attempting to indirectly coordinate multiple, concurrent acquisition processes, sufficient 
oversight is essential. For PMS-420 to function as an Adaptive Business Process able to 
coordinate multiple, concurrent acquisition processes, there needs to be better 
Coordination of Capabilities or commitment management.   In a sense-and-respond 
organization, a commitment is an agreement between two parties to produce a defined 
outcome.50  Commitment Management keeps track of who owes what to whom and 
enables the adaptive business process to identify the critical path and address 
commitment break downs.   By defining the roles of each mission system acquisition as a 
commitment, “it helps individuals and organizations understand there relationship to one 
another and their personal contributions to the organizations reason for being.”51  
B. MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
Coordinating the mission system programs managed directly or indirectly by 
PMS-420 requires the use of formal authority to facilitate commitment management.  The 
MOA does not give PMS-420 the formal authority needed because it is broadly worded 
in defining roles and responsibilities, and can vary from agreement to agreement. In 
addition, the MOA does not empower PMS-420 to direct specific action by a system 
program office or between system program offices.  To effectively run an aggressive, 
flexible acquisition program like the LCS Mission Module, PMS-420 requires more 
formalized authority to direct and request action from resource sponsors.  This level of 
authority is not granted to PMS-420 in the MOA. 52  In an adaptive business process, 
what is need is a standard universal protocol that describes how commitments between 
                                                 
50 Haeckel, 142 
51 Haeckel, 147 
52 Memorandum of Agreement between Warfare Directors, 7 
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organizations originate and how they should be carried out.53  A standard contract, 
detailing who owes what to whom, could serve as a universal protocol. One possible 
solution is for PMS-420 to adopt a system of commitment management with a Ship 
Project Directive (SPD).  An SDP is “a contractual document between two government 
programs in acquiring Government Furnished Equipment (GFE), Government Furnished 
Information (GFI) and services to support a shipbuilding program.” Ship Project 
Directive Systems are reference by a Naval Sea System Command instruction and have 
been in affect since 1984.54   An SPD will empower PMS-420 to:  
Transmit requirements and management direction from PMS-420 via PEO/LMW  
to Project Acquisition Resource Managers (PARMs) 
Provide funding to procure GFE, GFI, support equipment and services 
Provides detailed listing of all GFE and GFI with Required Delivery Dates 
(RDDs), Shipyard Preferred Dates (SYPDs) and Best Estimated Delivery Dates 
(BEDDs).55
Further details of SDP can be found at NAVSEAINST 5000.5, “Ship Project 
Directive Systems; implementation of” dated 09 June 1984.   
C. REQUIRED CULTURAL CHANGE  
The Department of Defense acquisition environment compels PMS-420 to re-
engineer its business process.  Yet, the functional areas of responsibility remain the same 
as the previous acquisition processes. The unintended consequences of keeping the 
functional areas the same is the “business as usual” mindset.  In order for PMS-420 to 
experience efficiency from business process re-engineering efforts, the “business as 
usual” mindset must give way to a culture that promotes expedience and efficiency, even 
if it means delegating decision authority to offices lower in the chain of command or 
forgoing the request for additional Department briefings.  The PMS-420 business process 
is obsolete for the adaptive and flexible acquisition strategy being employed in the LCS 
                                                 
53 Haeckel, 147 
54 Program Executive Office, Ships, “Ship Project Directive Process and Financial Analysis Process,” 
Power Point Brief (unpublished brief: October 21, 2005) 3   
55 PEO/Ships,  4   
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program, but they will be extremely difficult to re-engineer the process without an 
associated cultural change in the Department of the Navy (DoN), DoD and Congress.   
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. ADOPT A FLEXIBLE BUSINESS PLAN 
In Chapter II, this paper discussed an overview of business process re-
engineering.  Hammer and Champy’s key words in defining business process re-
engineering, are very applicable to the needs of PMS-420. These words are, fundamental, 
radical, dramatic and processes. 
The “Fundamental” business process of the acquisition life cycle drives PMS-420.  
Chapter IV and Appendix B provide a brief description of the acquisition life cycle that is 
based on the sequential steps of an acquisition strategy. When this fundamental business 
process is applied to the desire for an aggressive acquisition strategy with concurrent 
system development, the business process fails to meet expectations. The questions, 
“Why do we do it the way we do it?” must be answered with respect to the demands of 
the new acquisition strategy.  “Radical” is the re-engineered design concept that must 
take hold.  A flexible business approach must be implemented to manage the concurrent 
system development strategy which is fueled by an aggressive delivery schedule.  
“Dramatic” is the type of performance change needed.  When dealing with ACAT level I 
programs, any change in business process must produce dramatic results to satisfy the 
number of people and agencies that have oversight of the program. And finally, 
“processes” that place undo delay in the acquisition timeline must be eliminated.  The 
MDA must be kept aware of the myriad of issues surrounding a program. When the 
MDA is not in contact with the operational users and design teams, keeping the MDA 
aware requires more specific effort than when the MDA is in contact with operational 
users and design teams.  The process of updating the MDA can add time to the 
acquisition process.  PMS-420 must make fundamental, radical and dramatic change in 
the business process in order to meet the expectations of the current LCS Mission Module 
acquisition strategy. 
Recommendation:  MDA for all or some areas should be lowered to the PEO level 
to expedite the decision process and reduce time delays in updating each level of the 
command structure up to the MDA.  
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B. PROVIDE FORMALIZED AUTHORITY  
The MOA framework does not provide the level of commitment between people 
and organizations needed in this fast moving acquisition process.  Formulized authority 
must be granted to PMS-420 so that clear direction can be given with clear understanding 
of responsibilities between people and agencies.  PMS-420 should investigate alternative 
government agency-to-agency contracts that can be designed for the LCS Mission 
Module acquisition. 
Recommendation:  Implement a standard contract between government agencies 
that provides clear guidelines on who owes what to whom.   
C. GET DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY BUY-IN 
The most difficult part in re-engineering a business process is getting buy-in from 
senior management.  The Navy is supporting an aggressive acquisition strategy with the 
LCS Mission Module, and it must support an aggressive change in the way PMS-420 
does business in order to support the new strategy.  Re-engineering the PMS-420 
business process to make it adaptive and flexible means changing the “business as usual 
mindset” throughout the Navy.  As mentioned in Chapter IV, the MOA between the 
Warfare Directors acknowledges that Sea Frame and Mission Modules will be procured 
and developed separately; and that this unique approach requires a new approach to 
resourcing the Mission Modules.  However, the functional areas of responsibility for 
resourcing the Mission Modules remain the same as previous acquisition processes.  In 
order for there to be real buy-in to a changed process, the “business as usual mindset” 
must change also.  Part of this adaptive process would require MDA to be lowered to the 
PEO level to expedite the decision process.  This goes against the “business-as-usual  
 
mindset” and may prove to be impossible given current fiscal constraints.  However, 
given the efficiencies demonstrated by PMS-408, it should be considered by senior Navy 
officials.   
Recommendation: The Navy must support an aggressive change in the way PMS-
420 does business in order for PMS-420 to successfully support the LCS Mission Module 
acquisition strategy.   
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D. CONCLUSION 
DoD has pioneered the aggressive acquisition strategy for the LCS Mission 
Module.  Although the acquisition strategy for the LCS Mission Modules, concurrent 
system development, spiral development and modularity design of mission areas is 
attainable, the current business process does not support the strategy. 
Concurrent system development requires an adaptive, flexible business process 
that is difficult to engineer in a culture where the MDA is not directly in touch with the 
operational users.  Control must be placed at lower levels in order for the adaptive, 
flexible response to take place.  As the MDA for AAPs, PMS-408 is able to streamline 
the process because of close proximity to operational users and the ability to make quick 
decisions without briefing higher levels in the command structure.  Although this same 
responsiveness may not be possible with ACAT I-D level programs during times of fiscal 
constraint, DoD should seek every opportunity to lower the level for MDA so that a 
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APPENDIX B 
A. ACQUISITION PHASE DEFINITIONS  
The phase definitions in this appendix are an excerpt from the Introduction to 
Defense Acquisition Management pages 52-57. 56   
 
1.  Pre-Systems Acquisition 
Pre-systems acquisition is composed of activities in development of user needs, in 
science and technology, and in technology development work specific to the refinement 
of materiel solution(s) identified in the approved Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). 
Two phases comprise pre-systems acquisition: Concept Refinement and Technology 
Development.  
Concept Refinement begins with a Concept Decision by the Milestone Decision 
Authority. During this phase a Technology Development Strategy (TDS) is developed to 
help guide the efforts during the next phase, Technology Development. Also, a study 
called an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) is conducted to refine the selected concept 
documented in the approved ICD. To achieve the best possible system solution, Concept 
Refinement places emphasis on innovation and competition and on existing commercial 
off-the-shelf and other solutions drawn from a diversified range of large and small 
businesses. Concept Refinement ends when the Milestone Decision Authority approves 
the preferred solution supported by the AoA and approves the associated TDS.  
Technology Development begins after a Milestone A decision by the Milestone 
Decision Authority approving the TDS. The ICD and TDS guide the work during 
Technology Development. A favorable Milestone A decision normally does not mean 
that a new acquisition program has been initiated. For shipbuilding, however, programs 
may be initiated at the beginning of Technology Development.  
                                                 
56 Defense Acquisition University, 52-57 
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The purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and to determine the 
appropriate set of technologies to be integrated into a full system. During Technology 
Development a series of technology demonstrations may be conducted to help the user 
and the developer agree on an affordable, militarily useful solution based on mature 
technology. The project is ready to leave this phase when the technology for an 
affordable increment of a militarily useful capability has been demonstrated in a relevant 
environment  
 
2.  Systems Acquisition  
Milestone B. Milestone B will normally be program initiation for defense 
acquisition programs. For shipbuilding programs, the lead ship in a class of ships is also 
approved at Milestone B. Each increment of an evolutionary acquisition (explained later) 
will have its own Milestone B. Before making a decision, the Milestone Decision 
Authority will confirm that technology is mature enough for systems-level development 
to begin, the appropriate document from the Joint Capabilities Integration and 
Development System (JCIDS—see Chapter 6) has been approved, and funds are in the 
budget and the out-year program for all current and future efforts necessary to carry out 
the acquisition strategy. At Milestone B, the Milestone Decision Authority approves the 
acquisition strategy and the acquisition program baseline and authorizes entry into the 
System Development and Demonstration Phase.  
System Development and Demonstration Phase. Entrance criteria for this phase 
are technology (including software) maturity, funding, and an approved JCIDS 
document—the Capability Development Document. Programs that enter the acquisition 
process for the first time at Milestone B must have an Initial Capabilities Document 
(ICD) and a Capability Development Document. Unless there is some overriding factor, 
the maturity of the technology will determine the path to be followed by the program. 
Programs entering at Milestone B must have both a system architecture (defined set of 
subsystems making up the system) and an operational architecture (description of how 
this system interacts with other systems to include passing of data). The efforts of this 
phase are guided by the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) found in the approved 
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Capability Development Document and in the Acquisition Program Baseline (APB). The 
APB establishes program goals, called thresholds and objectives, for cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters that describe the program over its life cycle. This phase typically 
contains two efforts: Systems Integration and Systems Demonstration. A Design 
Readiness Review takes place at the end of Systems Integration.  
Systems Integration. A program enters System Integration when the program 
manager has a technical solution for the system, but the Component subsystems have not 
yet been integrated into a complete system. This effort typically includes the 
demonstration of prototype articles or engineering development models (EDM), 
sometimes in a competitive “fly-off.” A program leaves System Integration after 
prototypes have been demonstrated in a relevant environment (e.g., a first flight or 
interoperable data flow across system boundaries), the system configuration has been 
documented, and a successful Design Readiness Review has been completed.  
Design Readiness Review. During SDD the Design Readiness Review provides an 
opportunity for a mid-phase assessment of design maturity as evidenced by measures 
such as the number of design reviews successfully completed; the percentage of drawings 
completed; planned corrective actions to hardware/software deficiencies; adequate 
developmental testing; and an assessment of environment, safety, and occupational health 
risks; etc. Successful completion of the Design Readiness Review ends System 
Integration and continues the SDD phase into the System Demonstration effort.  
Systems Demonstration. This effort is intended to demonstrate the ability of the 
system to operate in a useful way consistent with the approved KPPs. The program enters 
System Demonstration when the PM has demonstrated the system in prototypes or 
EDMs. This effort ends when the system is demonstrated (using EDMs in its intended 
environment); measured satisfactorily against the KPPs; and determined to meet or 
exceed exit criteria and Milestone C entrance requirements. Industrial capabilities must 
also be reasonably available. Developmental test and evaluation is conducted to assess 
technical progress against critical technical parameters, and operational assessments are 
conducted to demonstrate readiness for production. The completion of this phase is 
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dependent on a Milestone Decision Authority decision to commit the program to 
production at Milestone C or to end the effort.  
Milestone C. The Milestone Decision Authority makes the decision to commit the 
Department of Defense to production at Milestone C. Milestone C authorizes entry into 
Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) or into production or procurement for systems that do 
not require LRIP. Milestone C authorizes limited deployment in support of operational 
testing for major automated information systems or software-intensive systems with no 
production components. If Milestone C is LRIP approval, a subsequent review and 
decision authorizes full rate production.  
Production and Deployment Phase. The purpose of this phase is to achieve an 
operational capability that satisfies mission needs. Operational test and evaluation 
determines the effectiveness and suitability of the system. Entrance into this phase 
depends on acceptable performance in development, test and evaluation, and operational 
assessment; mature software capability; no significant manufacturing risks; 
manufacturing processes under control (if Milestone C is full rate production); an 
approved ICD (if Milestone C is program initiation); an approved Capability Production 
Document (CPD); acceptable interoperability; acceptable operational supportability; and 
demonstration that the system is affordable throughout the life cycle, optimally funded, 
and properly phased for rapid acquisition. For most defense acquisition programs, 
Production and Deployment has two major efforts: Low Rate Initial Production and Full 
Rate Production and Deployment. It also includes a Full Rate Production Decision 
Review.  
Low Rate Initial Production. This effort is intended to result in completion of 
manufacturing development to ensure adequate and efficient manufacturing capability; 
produce the minimum quantity necessary to provide production or production-
representative articles for IOT&E; establish an initial production base for the system; and 
permit an orderly increase in the production rate sufficient to lead to full rate production 
upon successful completion of operational and, where applicable, live-fire testing. The 
Milestone Decision Authority determines the LRIP quantity for ACAT I and II programs 
at Milestone B. LRIP is not applicable to automated information systems or software-
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intensive systems with no developmental hardware; however, a limited deployment phase 
may be applicable. LRIP for ships and satellites is the production of items at the 
minimum quantity and rate that is feasible and that preserves the mobilization production 
base for that system.  
Full Rate Production Decision Review. Before granting a favorable Full Rate 
Production Decision Review, the Milestone Decision Authority considers initial 
operational test and evaluation and live fire test and evaluation results (if applicable); 
demonstrated interoperability; supportability; cost and manpower estimates; and 
command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence supportability and 
certification (if applicable). A favorable Full Rate Production Decision authorizes the 
program to proceed into the Full Rate Production and Deployment portion of the 
Production and Deployment Phase.  
Full Rate Production and Deployment. The system is produced and delivered to 
the field for operational use. During this phase, the program manager must ensure that 
systems are produced at an economical rate and deployed in accordance with the user’s 
requirement to meet the initial operational capability requirement specified in the 
Capability Production Document. Follow-on Operational Test and Evaluation may also 
be conducted, if appropriate, to confirm operational effectiveness and suitability or verify 
the correction of deficiencies. Operations and support begins as soon as the first systems 
are fielded/deployed; therefore, the Production and Deployment Phase overlaps the next 
phase—Operations and Support.  
Operations and Support Phase. During this phase full operational capability is 
achieved, each element of logistics support is evaluated (e.g., supply, maintenance, 
training, technical data, support equipment), and operational readiness is assessed. 
Logistics and readiness concerns dominate this phase. The supportability concept may 
rely on a government activity, a commercial vendor, or a combination of both to provide 
support over the life of the system. System status is monitored to ensure the system 
continues to meet the user’s needs. The operations and support phase includes 
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3.   Sustainment and Disposal 
Sustainment. Sustainment includes supply, maintenance, transportation, sustaining 
engineering, data management, configuration management, manpower, personnel, 
training, habitability, survivability, environment, safety (including explosives safety), 
occupational health, protection of critical program information, anti-tamper provisions, 
and information technology (including National Security Systems (NSS) supportability 
and interoperability functions). Effective sustainment of weapon systems begins with the 
design and development of reliable and maintainable systems through the continuous 
application of a robust systems engineering methodology. The program manager works 
with the users to document performance and support requirements in performance 
agreements specifying objective outcomes, measures, resource commitments, and 
stakeholder responsibilities. System modifications are made, as necessary, to improve 
performance and reduce ownership costs. Product improvement programs or service life 
extension programs may be initiated as a result of experience with the systems in the 
field. During deployment and throughout operational support, the potential for 
modifications to the fielded system continues. Modifications that are of sufficient cost 
and complexity to qualify as ACAT I or ACAT IA programs are considered as separate 
acquisition efforts for management purposes. Modifications that do not cross the ACAT I 
or ACAT IA threshold are considered part of the program being modified.  
Disposal of the system occurs at the end of its useful life. The program manager 
should have planned for disposal early in the system’s life cycle and ensured that system 
disposal minimizes DoD’s liability due to environmental safety, security, and health 
issues. Environmental considerations are particularly critical during disposal as there may 
be international treaty or other legal considerations requiring intensive management of 
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